![]() ![]() Whatever it may be, to achieve our long run epistemic goals, individuals or small teams must periodically make local contributions. Or, failing that, at least to achieve some other epistemic aim-we shall assume it is truth from here on out, though nothing turns on that choice of aim in particular. We hope that by inquiring together we may eventually discover the truth. We end by making a suggestion about the norms that it would be appropriate to hold scientific claims to, along with an explanation of why the social epistemology of science-considered as an instance of collective inquiry-would require such apparently lax norms for claims to be put forward. We then argue that features of the social epistemic arrangement of science which are necessary for its long run success require that we do not hold claims of scientific results to their standards. Bragg’s early twentieth century work in physics to demonstrate that successful science has in fact violated these norms. To defend this claim we draw upon the literature studying the norms of assertion, and consider how they would apply if one attempted to hold claims made in scientific papers to their strictures, as assertions and discovery claims in scientific papers seem naturally analogous. The correct answer is the nucleus in the atom.We argue that the main results of scientific papers may appropriately be published even if they are false, unjustified, and not believed to be true or justified by their author. But in the real case hydrogen is very stable nor emit any energy.
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